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ABSTRACT 
 
Given the recent events involving allegations of ethical misconduct by corporate executives and 
oversight neglect from the auditing community, the government was motivated to implement 
national reform to minimize the continued threat of corporate malfeasance. Due to the severity 
of these corporate scandals, Congress mandated and the President signed into law the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX-2002) to affect sweeping corporate disclosure and financial 
reporting reform to thwart continued scrupulous activities. In light of these events, the 
motivation of this study is to examine the effects of SOX-2002 in empowering independent 
auditors to provide unbiased opinions of an entity’s ability to remain as a going concern. The 
uniqueness of this study is that it attempts to determine if substantial doubt opinions signal 
bankruptcy greater than the chance occurrence of these events. If true, then these early warnings 
could be used to minimize the costs of bankruptcy. This study suggests that these opinions do 
signal bankruptcy filings greater than chance, which supports the position of auditor 
empowerment in a post-SOX-2002 period. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
n the wake of several recent, highly publicized corporate bankruptcies, investors and regulators alike have 
wondered why the risk of these companies was virtually unidentified.  The public confidence in Wall Street 
was shaken.  Government regulators and Congress began to look for weaknesses in the system.  Investors 
wondered why there was no seemingly no warning of these impending disasters.  Although there are tools in place 
that are meant to provide warning signals of firm financial distress, the reality of the situation is that judging the 
health of a firm is an uncertain, complex process.  Every year, each publicly traded company is required to issue 
audited financial statements.  The effectiveness of the existing audit process was called into question following the 
spectacular bankruptcies that occurred in 2001 and 2002.  During the U.S. Senate deliberations on the bill that would 
become the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX-2002), Weiss submitted a controversial report that suggested that of 
the 228 public companies that filed for bankruptcy in 2001, Enron and 95 other companies received clean audit 
opinions. While the Weiss report has been criticized by authors such as Maers, Maher, and Giacomino (2003) for 
presenting research that does not support the report’s conclusions, this controversy highlights the importance of the 
ongoing discussion on the topic of an auditor’s responsibility to assess the going concern status of a company. 
 
This paper evaluates the effects of SOX-2002 in empowering independent auditors to provide unbiased 
opinions of an entity’s ability to remain as a going concern. As firms continue to file for bankruptcy with little 
warning, community workforces are terminated or reduced, reorganizations continue to create internal havoc, and 
stockholders face potential stock devaluations and de-listings. When a substantial doubt opinion is warranted, it 
should contain useful information to provide stakeholders early warning for use in mitigating investment risks with 
firms that have underlying substantial doubt issues.  
 
This research seeks to determine the accuracy of the auditor’s opinion and its probability of signaling 
bankrupt state migration. The goal of the paper is to determine if auditors are successfully identifying firms with 
I 
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substantial doubt that migrate to a bankrupt state in the future. If true, this opinion would provide new information to 
the investment community and assist in restoring auditor confidence in light of recent corporate misconduct.  
 
Recent events involving allegations of ethical misconduct by corporate executives should motivate the 
auditing community to provide an unbiased review of financial statements to determine bankruptcy risk. Due to the 
severity of these corporate scandals, Congress mandated and the President signed into law SOX-2002 to affect 
sweeping corporate disclosure and financial reporting reform to thwart continued scrupulous activities. This Act was 
primarily designed to restore investor confidence following well-publicized bankruptcies where independent 
auditors failed to provide substantial opinions as to the ability of a firm to remain as a going concern. This study 
reviews the accuracy of the independent auditor opinion (IAO) in signaling bankruptcy and evaluates the 
effectiveness of the implementation of SOX-2002. Specifically, this study attempts to determine if SOX-2002 has 
empowered the auditor to give an opinion of substantial doubt that would warn stakeholders of bankruptcy risks 
greater than chance.  
 
If this research determines that post-SOX-2002 IAOs of substantial doubt signal bankrupt state migration 
greater than chance occurrence, this could be used in reducing the cost of firm misclassification, which was a 
concern of Koh (1991). An opinion of substantial doubt is, in essence, an opinion of a high probability of firm 
cessation. Therefore, it follows that bankruptcy filing, which is a firm’s legal cessation of immediate business 
operations, is often a derivative outcome of such an opinion. Significant proportional differences in success and 
failure rates of these opinions will help determine if the success rates are greater than chance occurrences of these 
events. These results can be used to validate the efficiency of the implementation of SOX-2002 with respect to 
IAOs. 
 
AUDITING STANDARDS BACKGROUND 
 
Auditor guidance with respect to the analysis of firm annual reports is often generated by Statements on 
Auditing Standards (SAS) issued by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA). Previous 
studies evaluating SAS guidelines suggest that factors such as fear of reprisal, litigation, and biased opinions due to 
improper relationships with management may have minimized the success rate of IAOs. Studies on SAS guidance 
implementation are mixed in determining if these IAOs have minimized the costs of misclassification where firms 
that were given going concern opinions later migrated to a bankrupt state. 
 
In 1981, the AICPA issued SAS No. 34: The Auditor’s Considerations When Question Arises about an 
Entity’s Continued Existence. In this issue, a going concern opinion was warranted unless observable and 
quantitative evidence existed contrary to this opinion (Levitan and Knoblett, 1985). Prior to 1981, little guidance 
was given for documenting cases of substantial doubt when a firm’s continued existence was in question until the 
AICPA issued SAS No. 54. However, even SAS No. 54 was found to be of little economic value due to its 
meaningless and ambiguous language. This guidance merely suggested that auditors use subjective evaluation 
methods in issuing their opinions. In 1987, a proposed SAS guideline suggested more serious auditor involvement 
and opinion accountability but again failed to motivate a more rigorous auditor review. In 1988, this proposal was 
amended and the AICPA issued SAS No. 59 in an attempt to combat the going concern issue.   
 
 Since 1989, SAS No. 59 has provided guidance to the auditor in the conduct of a financial audit to 
determine a firm’s ability to continue as a going concern based on a going concern assumption. When the going 
concern assumption fails to hold, an opinion of substantial doubt is mandated. The going concern assumption is the 
continuation of the firm in the absence of significant contrary evidence. Contrary evidence exists when an auditor 
determines that a firm does not have the ability to meet its continual obligations as they become due without 
substantial disposition of assets, debt restructuring, externally forced revisions of its operations, or similar activities 
(SAS NO. 59.01) within one year from the firm’s annual report (SAS NO. 59.02). Although, an opinion of doubt 
may be waived if the auditor believes management has presented a case in which it plans to mitigate the effects of 
such events (SAS NO. 59.03 and SAS NO. 59.12).  SAS No. 59 recognizes that a firm may cease to exist following 
a going concern opinion and suggests that this opinion should not reflect negatively on the auditor because the 
opinion only assesses general assurance of a firm’s ability to remain as a going concern (SAS NO. 59.04).  
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Literature Review 
 
Some argue that the continued existence of corporate irregularities after the issuance of SAS No. 59 
suggests that auditors are not being held accountable.  However, auditors are faced with complex situations when 
assessing the going concern status of a firm.  The issuance of a going-concern opinion by an auditor is a serious 
situation for the affected firm. Koh (1991) found that bankruptcy prediction models can be useful to auditors in 
making going concern assessments.   His work was the first to explicitly consider the misclassification costs of Type 
I and Type II errors when determining the optimal cut-offs points for the probit model.  Misclassification is an 
extremely important consideration for auditors making going concern assessments.  As Tucker, Matsumura, and 
Subramanyam (2003) suggest, there is a self-fulfilling prophecy effect associated with the issuance of going concern 
opinions.  Specifically, when an auditor publicly expresses doubt in a company’s ability to continue as a going 
concern, it may hasten the company’s end.  Therefore, auditors must carefully weigh the risks and benefits of issuing 
a going-concern opinion.   
 
Given the complex nature of the issues surrounding going concern opinions, it is not surprising that several 
researchers have studied this area.   These studies have shown that both qualitative and quantitative factors are 
important when auditors consider whether or not to issue a going-concern opinion.  In fact, SAS No. 59 specifically 
directs auditors to consider factors beyond the company’s current financial position.  Koh (1991) suggested that 
variables such as management ability and future plans, which were introduced by SAS No. 59, could affect the 
probability of a firm continuing as a going concern. Behn, Kaplan and Krumwiede (2001) find that auditors are 
sensitive to information provided in publicly disclosed management plans available in 10-K reports, the 
management discussion and analysis (MD&A), and annual reports.  In particular, they conclude that management 
plans may mitigate negative financial information that may otherwise lead to a going concern opinion.   
 
Raghunandan and Rama (1995) suggest that SAS No. 59 was issued in response to public concerns about 
auditors not providing early warnings of client failures.  After controlling for financial factors and size, they found 
that the proportion of client bankruptcies with prior going-concern modified reports was significantly higher after 
SAS No. 59 became effective than it was prior to the implementation of SAS No. 59.  Thus, they suggested that SAS 
No. 59 had a significant positive effect on the auditor’s report of firms in financial distress.  They concluded that the 
efforts of the Accounting Standards Board (ASB) in issuing SAS No. 59, which contained additional guidance to 
auditors in identifying firms having substantial doubt, were successful. 
 
As a continuation of earlier work, Geiger, Raghunandan, and Rama (1998) studied the mean probability of 
bankruptcy before and after the implementation of SAS No. 59.  They found no significant difference in the mean 
probability of bankruptcy between the two periods, which indicates that auditors were not issuing going-concern 
modified reports to differently stressed companies post-SAS 59.  Therefore, they suggest that SAS No. 59 only 
codified existing practice as auditors were actively evaluating the going-concern status of clients prior to SAS No. 
59.  Taken together, the findings of these two studies (Raghunandan and Rama (1995) and Geiger (1998) et al) 
suggest that auditor reporting post-SAS No. 59 may have improved because more bankrupt companies are receiving 
going concern modified reports, yet a similar percentage of companies fail after receiving these reports. 
 
In contrast, Grice (2000) supported Koh’s 1991 findings that prior to the issuance of SAS No. 59, auditors 
were not accountable in their evaluation of a firm’s going concern opinion. However, as a result of SAS No. 59, 
auditors have been required to take a more active role in determining the going concern opinion. However, Grice 
found that prediction models continued to outperform auditors at signaling impending failure post-SAS No. 59. 
Essentially, he found that the increased responsibility imposed by SAS No. 59 did not affect the efficiency or 
accuracy of an auditor’s opinion of the going concern issue. 
 
 A recent study by Citron and Taffler (2004) suggests that the language required when issuing a going 
concern opinion may impact the willingness of auditors to issue going-concern opinions.  Citron and Taffler (2004) 
tested the impact of a new audit reporting standard versus an enhanced audit procedures standard in the U.K. They 
found that the increase in going-concern opinions during the 1990s, a strong economic period in the U.K., was 
directly associated with the introduction of a less confrontational audit reporting standard.  This finding suggests that 
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less contentious boilerplate language for going concern reports may encourage more auditors to issue going-concern 
opinions for financially distressed firms.    
 
In summary, there is a lack of consistent findings in the literature with respect to the information content of 
IAOs.  This research seeks to expand the current body of knowledge by extending Geiger et al (1998) and studying 
the ability of auditors to successfully identify firms with substantial doubt that migrate to a bankrupt state post-SOX-
2002.  After reviewing the limited success of pre-SOX-2002 SAS guidance and the desired effects of SOX-2002, 
this research asserts that the latter mandate has empowered the independent auditor to give unbiased opinions of 
substantial doubt that signal bankrupt state migrations with success rates greater than chance. If true, then a 
significant economic stakeholder wealth effect can be realized through the warning signals of these opinions. 
 
METHOD 
 
This study evaluates success rates using three proposed models: a benchmarked Events Model
1
, an Auditor 
Model, and a Chance Model. The Events Model evaluates the naturally occurring rates of going concern bankrupt 
state migrations. The Auditor Model evaluates the proportion of firms with IAOs of substantial doubt that migrate to 
the bankrupt state. The Chance Model evaluates the probability that a going concern selected at St migrates to a 
bankrupt state at St+1 by chance. 
 
The goal is to determine if significant differences exist in trial successes
2
 of going concerns selected to 
migrate to a bankrupt state from St to St+1
3
 between the Auditor Model and Chance Model. The binomial z-statistic 
shown as equation (1) is used to evaluate the proportional success rate differences:  
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Chance Models, respectively; and n1 and n2 = are the sample sizes of Auditor and Chance Model firms, respectively.
4
  
 
Research design 
 
The AICPA’s auditor guidance suggested that a dichotomous classification system be used to indicate an 
entity’s future state as either the continuation or discontinuation of its current status. Therefore, this study evaluates 
the success rates of these opinions in predicting bankrupt state migrations.
5
 This study is unique in that it evaluates 
those success rates against a random selection of firms that naturally migrated to bankrupt state during the 
evaluation period. Previous bankrupt state migration studies (Raghunandan and Rama 1995, Chen and Church 1992, 
and Levitan and Knoblett 1985) did not rule out these chance effects.
 
  
 
Data collection 
 
The secondary data for this research were contained in independent auditor statements within 10-K annual 
reports filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). These firms were screened to include those that: 
(1) trade on a U.S. market exchange, (2) have a U.S. state of incorporation, (3) are located and operating in the U.S., 
(4) have a non-ADR status, and (5) do not have a SIC 6000 identification (to omit financial institutions). The data 
were collected iteratively through sequential reviews from the SEC website (www.sec.gov). 
 
The pre-migration period, St, is the period of the current 10-K annual report, which was the period prior to 
the evaluation period. This allows for a 12-month study period for the evaluation period, St+1.  
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 This study benchmarks the actual successes of the Events Model
6
 to determine significant proportional trial 
differences between the Auditor Model
7
 and the Chance Model
8
 in correctly signaling bankrupt state migrations. If 
the Auditor Model is found to have greater trial successes than the Chance Model, then stakeholders can use it as a 
timely signal of potential financial health problems for a firm so that preemptive measures can be taken to minimize 
bankruptcy costs. 
 
RESULTS 
 
The evaluation period was initially developed as the latest time frame available prior to the initiation of this 
study so current market information could be used. This period was determined to be from October 2003 through 
September 2004. A sample of 3,883 firms from the 12-month pre-migration period was used to determine Auditor 
and Chance Model success rates (see Table 1 and Figure 1). (Insert Table 1 and Figure 1 here.) 10-K annual reports 
from the same time period were reviewed for substantial doubt opinions. These firms were then reviewed in the 
evaluation period to determine subsequent bankrupt state migrations. 
 
A total of 401 bankrupt and going concern firms from the Events Model were used to evaluate the Chance 
and Auditor Models. These firms were randomly selected from the 3,883 pre-migration going concerns in proportion 
to the number of bankrupt firms determined during the evaluation period (see Table 1). The bankrupt firms were 
going concerns at St that migrated to a bankrupt state during the evaluation period. The sampling proportions and 
success rates are summarized below. 
 
 The Events Model included 61 bankrupt and 340 healthy firms, which accounted for a 100% success rates. 
The Auditor Model and Chance Models each consisted of 68 bankrupt and 333 going concerns, which were selected 
from the 3,883 pre-migration Events Model going concerns. Of the 68 Chance Model firms randomly selected at St 
to migrate to a bankrupt state, 11 migrated to a bankrupt state and 57 remained as going concerns during the 
evaluation period, which was a 16.18% success rate. Of the 68 Auditor Model firms classified as having substantial 
doubt at St, 27 migrated to a bankrupt state and 41 firms remained as going concerns during the evaluation period, 
which was a 39.71% success rate.  
 
Analysis using a z-statistic also suggests that the Auditor Model has greater trial successes in identifying 
firms that have the potential to migrate to a bankrupt state (z = -2.8112).
9
 Therefore, this research suggests that the 
probability of Auditor Model firms evaluated as having substantial doubt at St that migrate to a bankrupt state at St+1 
is greater than the probability that Chance Model firms selected as bankrupt at St will migrate to a bankrupt state at 
St+1. 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
Since differences exist between the Chance and Auditor Models, this study concludes that the Auditor 
Model contains significant information to use in evaluating the potential for bankrupt state migrations for firms with 
substantial doubt opinions. As statistically determined, the proportion of success rates of the Auditor Model firms 
classified at St with substantial doubt that actually migrated to a bankrupt state during the evaluation period is 
greater than the rates of the Chance Model bankrupt firms selected and evaluated during this same time period. The 
implication is that the implementation of the SOX-2002 legislation is empowering the independent auditor’s and 
allowing unbiased opinions of the future state of a firm’s existence.  
 
These findings suggest that substantial doubt opinions are more likely than arbitrary selection to identify 
bankrupt state migrations.  Thus, there is now empirical evidence to support continued empirical evaluation of this 
research question. The ultimate goal is to further assist the auditor in efficiently evaluating the probability of the 
continued existence of a firm.  
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
This paper investigates the effect of SOX-2002 in empowering the independent auditor to provide an 
unbiased opinion of an entity’s ability to remain as a going concern. The goal was to determine if independent 
auditor opinions (Auditor Model) provide information that helps to predict bankruptcy state migrations better than a 
Chance Model. In other words, this investigation helps to determine if auditor opinions are efficient in identifying 
firms with substantial doubt as to their status as going concerns. If efficiency exists, it would provide important 
information to the investment community and assist in restoring confidence in the auditor community and in the 
U.S. financial markets. The underlying issue is the enormous cost of misclassification due to recent events involving 
allegations of ethical misconduct by corporate executives where no warnings were given to the stakeholder prior to 
respective bankrupt state migrations. Given these events, oversight neglect of the auditing system has motivated the 
legislation of SOX-2002 to minimize the effects of continued corporate malfeasance.   
 
This study, which reviews the effectiveness of the IAO in signaling bankruptcy, concludes that the 
implementation of SOX-2002 is helping to restore the legitimacy of the independent auditor’s opinion of substantial 
doubt in signaling bankruptcy with firms whose continued existence as an entity is in question. While previous 
studies suggest mixed results, this study concludes that the AICPA SAS No. 59, which is supported by SOX-2002, 
is an effective tool in signaling bankruptcy migration. 
 
SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
Future research using the IAO combined with other nominal variables such as default status, debt 
covenants and other variables that may contribute to the IAO, could be used to fit a statistically significant model to 
assist the auditor in his/her classification of a firm with respect to the question of substantial doubt. Table 2 lists the 
27 bankrupt firms that auditors correctly classified as having substantial doubt in this study. (Insert Table 2 here.) 
An investigation of these firm’s annual reports could provide insights as to the financial and economic causes of 
bankruptcy migration. LaSalle and Anandaragan (1996) have suggested that an entity’s bad news characteristics are 
more important than those presented by good news. Chen and Church (1992) have suggested that auditors carefully 
consider default status in making going-concern decisions. They found that a going concern model that includes 
default status and financial variables outperforms other models in power and in expected cost of misclassification. 
They also found that auditors rely heavily on default status in making going concern opinions without careful 
consideration of a firm’s financial variables. They suggested that auditors may benefit from the use of a going 
concern model that includes both default status and financial variables.  
 
In addition, Levitan and Knoblett (1985) found that auditors were successful in predicting going concern 
difficulties and their opinions were consistent with their client’s subsequent health. However, these high success 
rates were due to auditor tendency not to render a going concern exception, i.e., firms with going concern difficulties 
were given a going concern opinion even though they found negative information that previously led to a bankrupt 
status. Chen and Wei (1993) found that debt covenant waiver decisions were more likely to occur with firms with a 
lower probability of bankruptcy and lower leverage ratio. 
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NOTES 
 
1
 The success rates of Events Model firms benchmarked those of the Auditor and Chance Models.  
2
 Trial success occurs either when an auditor correctly classifies a going concern as having substantial doubt at St and the 
firm migrates to a bankrupt state at St+1, when a firm was selected at St from the Chance Model to migrate from St to a 
bankrupt state at St+1, or when firms migrated to a bankrupt state naturally, as with Event Model firms. The intent is to 
determine which model has the maximum correct trial successes of bankrupt state migrations. 
3
 St is the period of the 10-K annual report and St+1 is the post 10-K annual report period or evaluation period. 
4
 This is a left-tailed test because of the interest in evaluating the differences in the success rates of the Auditor and Chance 
Models as compared o the Events Model (α = .01 and C.V. = -2.33). This is justified due to the high cost of 
misclassification of unforecasted bankrupt state migrations. 
5
 A classification of substantial doubt means that a firm may not remain as a going concern. The legal way of migrating to 
this state is through insolvency proceedings or bankruptcy. Given this cost as a major economic and financial concern 
(Koh, 1991) and the attempt of SOX-2002 to make corporate executives accountable, it was a natural progression to 
evaluate the success rates of these substantial doubt opinions.  
6
 This evaluated going concern bankrupt state migrations from St to St+1. 
7
 This evaluated firm’s with substantial doubt opinions bankrupt state migration from St to St+1. 
8
 This evaluated the chance occurrences of going concerns selected at St to migrate to a bankrupt state at St+1. 
 
9
 The raw data for the z calculation is, 
     
100 27 100 11
100 68 100 68
2.8112
.31 .69 .31 .69
61 61
z
   
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
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Table 1: Proportional Bankrupt-Healthy Sample 
 
 #BR #H P(BR) P(H) #H*(P(BR)) Rounded 
Oct-03 8 103 0.13 0.03 13.51 14 
Nov-03 5 43 0.08 0.01 3.52 4 
Dec-03 5 2866 0.08 0.74 234.92 235 
Jan-04 7 175 0.11 0.05 20.08 20 
Feb-04 7 57 0.11 0.01 6.54 7 
Mar-04 7 219 0.11 0.06 25.13 25 
Apr-04 3 67 0.05 0.02 3.30 3 
May-04 5 71 0.08 0.02 5.82 6 
Jun-04 6 232 0.10 0.06 22.82 23 
Jul-04 2 35 0.03 0.01 1.15 1 
Aug-04 3 10 0.05 0.00 0.49 1* 
Sep-04 3 5 0.05 0.00 0.25 1* 
Total 61 3883 1.00 1.00 338 340 
*Notes: This table reports the results of the methodology in determining the proportional sample of bankrupt and healthy 
firms at St+1. This proportion consists of a base of 61 firms that migrated to a bankrupt state and a proportional sample of 
340 healthy firms. The basis of this sample was 3,883 firms selected by fiscal year in proportion to the bankrupt firms 
across number and fiscal year from October 2003 through November 2004. For example, in Oct-03, there were 8 
bankrupt firms (#BR) and 103 healthy firms (#H). The proportion of bankrupt firms (P(BR)) was 0.13 (8/61) and healthy 
firms (P(H)) was 0.03 (103/3883). This following that the proportion of firms in Oct-03 was 13.51 (#H*(P(BR)), which 
was rounded to 14.  
 
 
Table 2: Correctly Identified Firms Classified as Having  
Substantial Doubt that Actually Migrated to a Bankrupt State at St+1. 
 
Name SIC CIK 
Bankruptcy 
Date 
CPOR FAOD 
Acclaim Entertainment, Inc. 7372 804888 9/1/2004 20040331 20040701 
Avado Brands 5812 849101 2/4/2004 20021229 20030304 
Big Buck Brewery &Steakhouse, Inc. 5810 1009652 6/10/2004 20021229 20040223 
Briazz, Inc. 5812 1045598 6/7/2004 20031228 20040330 
Dexterity Surgical 3842 860131 3/19/2004 20031231 20040329 
Driver Harris Co. 3350 30197 11/26/2003 20021231 20030509 
DT Industries 3559 918999 5/12/2004 20030629 20031014 
Eagle Building Tech. Inc. 3270 947431 1/30/2004 20021231 20030728 
Entertainment Technologies & Programs, Inc. 7900 922257 11/6/2003 20020930 20030116 
Fortune Natural Resources Corp. 1311 38242 6/1/2004 20011231 20020412 
Holiday RV Superstores, Inc. 5500 822076 10/20/2003 20021231 20030603 
International Biochemical Industries, Inc. 2842 1059623 1/17/2004 20020630 20021016 
Minorplanet Systems USA 4812 944400 2/2/2004 20030831 20031201 
MPM Technologies 1040 799268 3/19/2004 20031231 20040415 
One Price Clothing Stores 5621 812446 2/9/2004 20030201 20030523 
Online Power Supply, Inc. 4911 1101152 5/14/2004 20011231 20020415 
Options Talent Group 7310 741012 10/31/2003 20020731 20021113 
Prologic Management Systems 5045 938320 2/2/2004 20030331 20030630 
RCN Corp. 4813 1041858 5/27/2004 20031231 20040429 
Redline Performance Products, Inc. 3790 1121131 8/27/2004 20040331 20040331 
Reptron Electronics, Inc. 5065 918765 10/28/2003 20021231 20030415 
Republic Engineered Products Holdings LLC 3312 1216462 10/6/2003 20021231 20021231 
Rouge Industries, Inc. 3312 918577 10/23/2003 20021231 20030218 
U.S. Plastic Lumber Corp. 4955 1014851 7/23/2004 20021231 20030415 
Universal Access Global Holdings, Inc. 4812 1070699 8/4/2004 20031231 20031231 
Wickes, Inc 5211 910620 1/20/2004 20021228 20030411 
Women First Healthcare, Inc. 5122 1081004 4/29/2004 20031231 20040330 
Notes: CPOR and FAOD are SEC’s notation for Confirmed Period of Report and Filed as of Date for 10-K Annual 
Reports. The Standard Industry Classification (SIC) and Central Index Key (CIK) are the unique firms identification as 
classified by the SEC.  
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Figure 1: Events Model, Chance Model, and Auditor Model Classification Results 
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Notes:  
1. The Events Model consisted of a total of 401 firms selected from a sample of 3,883 firms. Of these, 61 
went bankrupt (BR) during the evaluation period and 340 remained as going concerns (GC). The success rates 
were simply the actual number of BR state migrations of the BR firms and the actual number of firms that 
remained as GCs during the evaluation period. 
2. The Chance Model firms were sampled from the 401 Events Model firms. Of these firms, 68 were selected 
to migrate to a BR state and 333 were selected to remain as GCs. This yielded a 16.18% success rate and an 
83.82% failure rate. 
3. The Auditor Model firms were sampled from the 401 Events Model firms. These firms consisted of the 
same initial proportion of firms selected to migrate to a BR state and to remain as GCs (68 and 333 
respectively). This yielded a 39.71% success rate and an 60.29% failure rate. 
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NOTES 
